[randomizedcoder]

What

Security red-team program for xtcp2 running in its production shape: the OCI image under Docker on Ubuntu 22.04/24.04 hosts, with /var/lib/xtcp2 bind-mounted (the TODO-SOON §29 topology). The attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of this open-source repo.

Two documents:

• docs/redteam-plan.md — threat model, six attacker profiles, an attack-surface inventory, and a ~60-scenario catalog in ten families:

  • RT-1/RT-9 recon and network position (unauthenticated scrape/stream, TTL reach, route_localnet, host-network vs bridge exposure)
  • RT-2 authentication attacks (HMAC replay window, auth-mode confusion footguns, timing, plaintext token capture)
  • RT-3 admin API abuse (ConfigService.Set telemetry redirection = full socket-record exfil, S3 exfil with inherited creds, pprof secret scraping)
  • RT-4 DoS (connection exhaustion — the unwired max_connections limits, slow consumers, namespace churn, broker outage)
  • RT-5 host attacks through xtcp2: netlink write audit (the daemon should send only GET-class netlink), setns scope, privileged-container blast radius, minimum-cap matrix
  • RT-6 filesystem/UDS attacks (stale-socket unlink, replacement races, baseline poisoning)
  • RT-7 artifacts (ASN parquet/zstd decompression bombs, bootstrap integrity)
  • RT-8 parser/protocol attacks (hostile-netns netlink stress, /ip argv-path fuzzing, extended fuzz campaigns)
  • RT-10 dependency/CVE surface (govulncheck gate)
  • RT-11 monitoring-blindness from a co-tenant container: what an attacker container on the same host can do to stop TCP statistics about the base OS and other tenants from being reported — scrape-slot starvation (MaxRequestsInFlight=10), FD exhaustion crossing into the collection path, own-netns dump amplification, L2 delivery kills, and the privileged tiers (docker.sock, netfilter, netns flood/poisoning). Includes the tier × reporting-link matrix and a blind-detection runbook deliverable.

  The scenarios treat every documented limitation in docs/security.md ("Resource protections and implementation limits") as an attacker checklist.

• docs/redteam-implementation.md — execution companion: harness architecture (Vagrant/libvirt on l, Ubuntu 24.04 + Docker + the OCI image, deployment matrix env, flake-app wrapping), per-phase tasks with checkbox definition of done, the EXPECT=CONFIRMED scenario contract (expectation flips travel with fixes, then graduate to regression gates), cross-cutting workstreams, effort estimates (~23–29 days), risks, and program-level exit criteria.

docs/README.md links both.

Notes for review

• Documentation only — no code, Nix, or harness files yet; Phase 0 (the vagrant/ bootstrap) starts on approval.
• Scenario IDs are stable and map to the implementation plan's phases 0–7.
• Existing coverage is cross-referenced (microVM uds-security/ip-listen/scrape-auth checks, fixture tests, fuzz targets) so the Ubuntu/Docker suite covers only the deltas.

Closes nothing yet; findings from execution will file their own issues.